The Circularity of Consent in the DMA: A Close Look into the Prejudiced Substance of Articles 5(2) and 6(10)

Abstract

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) captures gatekeeper power to address the lack of contestability and unfairness in digital markets. Its provisions imbricate into the regulatory landscape bearing in mind complementarity regarding other acts of Union law which also apply to certain aspects of the digital arena, namely the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the e-Privacy Directive. The DMA does not override the provisions of these rules, although the practical implementation of its do’s and don’ts will question the value of non-economic interests which have been at the forefront of EU policy at large in their interaction with digital business models. In the particular case of the intersection between privacy and antitrust, Articles 5(2) and 6(10) of the DMA stand out as the two key areas where the interpretation of the GDPR will play a major role, namely through the force of consent, legal basis, and user choice. Although both provisions impose negative and positive obligations on personal data, their role is tempered when the user is presented with a specific choice and grants consent to the gatekeeper to combine and use personal data. The paper analyses the potential implications of both provisions in light of the existence of power and information asymmetries between gatekeepers and end users. The paper navigates the cases that have inspired the framework of the DMA in this regard, from an antitrust and data protection perspective. The paper identifies that the interaction between the concept of consent and the massive collection and processing of personal data is designed according to a circular concept. The DMA builds up its provisions on Articles 5 and 6 on the same premise. The paper identifies the circularity which the DMA’s enforcers might incur when enforcing the regulatory instrument.